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The1920's
GarfieldV. Coxinvestigatedsix forecasting services during the 1920's.°
Geoffrey H. Moore has devised methods of utilizing Cox's results to
show the pattern of recognition of cyclical turning points and has ap-
plied the methods to 1919—27. The results of adding the 1929 peak
to Moore's findings appear in Charts 1-2 and 1-3 below.
For each month of the period covered, Cox excerpted a brief quota-
tion from each of six forecasting services, summarizing the service's
view of the outlook. Cox then scored the quotations in two different
ways, for warning of turning points and for general correctness. For
purposes of the former, he determined dates of "major" upturns and
downturns in the Annalist Index of Business Activity. These dates,
fortunately, are in one-to-one correspondence with the NBER reference
peaks and troughs for the decade in question.7 Beginning with the
earliest month in which any of the six forecasting services correctly
predicted the turn, Cox rated each service for the month according to
whether the direction of its prediction was right, wrong, or neutral (i.e.,
no forecast of a change in direction)Forexample, on August 5,1919,
0 Appraisalof American Business Forecasts. The second edition differs
from the first, which was published in 1929, by incorporating part of the pre-
liminary results of the author's study of 1928—29, published as "Another Year
of Business Forecasts," Journal of Business, April 1930, pp. 15 1—170.
1ibid.,p. 31. In three of the eight cases, the dates of Cox and the NBER are
identical, in two cases the discrepancy is one month, in one case two months.
(See Table I-i.) Cox's March 1921 upturn is four months earlier than the NBER's
trough of July 1921. (The latterisa revision of the September 1921 date
originally given.)Cox's March 1927 downturnissix months later than the
NBER's October 1926 peak. (By "upturn" and "downturn," Cox meant approxi-
mately the same as what the NBER means by "trough" and "peak.") Even the
large discrepancies seldom make a difference for present purposes (but cf. note 15
below).
SIbid.,pp. 32—3 4. In some cases, notably 1926, the decision to begin the
scoring with the first month in which any of the six services correctly anticipated
the change of direction results in a bias (see Chart 1-2). The scoring begins with









—6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4
Months before (—)orotter (+) NBER peak or trough
SOURCE:Garfield V. Cox, An Appraisal of American Business Forecasts,
revised ed., Chicago, 1930, pp. 85—90.
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CHART 1-3
Correctness of Forecasts Made in the Vicinity of Peaks
and Troughs, Six Forecasting Services, 1919—29
v v \/
peak
SouRcE: Cox, American Business Forecasts, Table I.
one forecaster said, "My opinion, briefly, is that there will be a distinct
shortage of labor this fall ..andthis shortage may continue into
next year; but that before long we are going to experience a real period
earlier months none of the forecasts was correct. In computing the averages for
months designated —6, —5, —4, —3, and —2 on the chart, 1926 has been
omitted from the denominator as well as the numerator. An alternative procedure
would be to consider all forecasters as having made incorrect forecasts for the
five months prior to September 1926. The average per cent of correct forecasts
six months before the four peaks would be reduced from 25 per cent to 13 per
cent, if all forecasts not available for this reason (including five at the January
1920 peak) were included in the denominator; five months before, from 17 per
cent to 13 per cent, etc.
With respect to anticipation of major turning points, Cox gave the forecasts
numerical scores for accuracy in predicting (1) amplitude of the expected move-
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of unemployment."Cox rated this forecast correct, since it anticipated
the downturn which he dated in March 1920 (the NBER peak is Janu-
ary). Another forecaster said on March 26, 1923, "probabilities are be-
coming apparent that the Prosperity Period may be over around the be-
ginning of 1924." 10Coxconsidered this forecast wrong. His date for the
downturn was May 1923 (the same as the NBER peak). The forecast
for the last half of 1923 was for the wrong direction.
Cox's only explanation of the criteria he used in deciding whether a
given forecast was right, neutral, or wrong consisted of the following:
"A service which, within a given period prior to a major turn, was
either silent or predicted a continuation of the existing rate of activity
is assumed to have done its clients neither good nor harm. It is treated
as having misled its clients only when it predicted a change in the
wrong direction."Withso little to go on, one cannot be sure of the
exact meaning of the data in Chart 1-2. Our experience with scoring
later forecasts by different methods suggests that Cox's scores, like ours,
have a considerable element of subjectivity.
Panel B of Chart 1-2 shows that, taking all eight peaks and troughs
together, the percentage of correct predictions of the changed direction
rises from 33 per cent six months before the cyclical reversal to 79 per
cent three months after. Although it then falls off to 59 per cent and
53 per cent in the fourth and fifth months after the turning point, it
rebounds to 71 per cent six months after the turn. The per cent of
scores were added and given a plus sign if the direction of change was correctly
predicted, a minus sign if incorrectly predicted. Thus he derived a number repre-
senting the "adequacy" of each forecast. No use has been made here of his scores
for amplitude and timing. Since the method underlying Chart 1-2 utilizes only
the correctness (or otherwise) of the forecasts of direction of change, omitting
amplitude, the results may be biased in an upward direction. That is, a service
that predicted the direction of change correctly gets full credit even if it thought
the ensuing movement would be too minor to count, under NBER rules, as a
cyclical expansion or contraction. Cox's scores cannot suitably be used here
because, as he says, "In scoring a succession of forecasts,...thelater the date
of prediction of a turn the more definite it must be concerning time and amplitude
in order to receive a given rating." (Ibid., p. 34.) His numerical scores, therefore,
do not exhibit the pattern of increasing recognition, since his method tends to
eliminate the very increase we are interested in studying.
9Charles0. Hardy and Garfield V. Cox, Forecasting Business Conditions, New
York, 1927, p. 348.
10Ibid.,p. 370.
11.AmericanBusiness Forecasts, 1st ed., pp. 30—31. This implies a neutral (zero)
score if the forecaster predicted leveling off instead of a peak or trough. Pre-
sumably the "given period" begins with the first month in which any of the
services correctly anticipated the coming turn.12 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
wrong forecasts (not shown on the chart) fluctuates erratically between
5 and 14 per cent from six months before until two months after the
turn. It then drops off to zero for two months.
In a broad way, the pattern shown in Chart 1-2 is typical of what
we shall find for more recent times. During the six months before a
peak or trough, the percentage of services anticipating a change of direc-
tion is rather low. But it rises steadily, reaching its height a few months
after the turn. In some respects, however, the results of the Cox-Moore
analysis are surprising. The unexpectedly high percentage of correct
anticipations before the turn may be attributed in part to the bias dis-
cussed in note 8. On the other hand, the maximum—79 per cent for all
eight peaks and troughs, reached three months later—is considerably
short of unanimity. Rather puzzling is the drop after plus three months
instead of the rise that might have been expected. With some exceptions
scores tend to be higher in the vicinity of troughs than at peaks (Panel
A). Results similar in kind but more marked in degree will be presented
below for 1948—61.
Cox's scores for correctness, on a scale from plus one to minus one,
were designed for forecasts made at any time, not just in the vicinity
of turning points.12 A forecast made on February 13, 1919, that "this
is bound to be a dull year in trade and transportation," for instance,
was given the minimum score of minus one.'3 The year in fact was one
of inflationary boom. A forecast made on October 11, 1923, that "the
first half or three-quarters of 1924 is to be a time of trade reaction or
mild depression, but not of anything worse," received the maximum
score of plus one.'4 Zero was given for the statement made on November
18, 1926, that "the first half or two thirds of next year is likely to be
a time of mild trade reaction" because Cox considered the prediction
right with respect to what would happen but wrong as to timing.'5 In
all his scoring, Cox's criterion was "whether the shaping of policy in
12 Cox also scored the forecasts for definiteness on a scale of plus one to zero
and multiplied the scores for definiteness and correctness to get a score for
adequacy. These scores are not used here because, like the scores for timing,
"a higher standard of definiteness was required concerning the character, of the
predicted event if the service had indicated that it should be expected almost at
once than if it had been thought to lie six months in the future." (Ibid., p. 19.)
13 ibid., pp. 17—18.
14 ibid., p. 17.
15 ibid., p.18. Note that his peak date was March 1927. On the basis of the
NBER peak of October 1926, this statement could be regarded as substantially
correct.1948—61: Accuracy of Dating 13
conformity with the forecast in question would, on the whole, have been
a step in the right direction or in the wrong one." 16Predictionswere
assumed to apply to no more than eight months into the future unless
the forecaster indicated otherwise. A forecast of conditions in a special
sector was judged only by events in that sector. Forecasts of general
business were checked either against the composite index of business
activity specified by the service or, failing that, against three composite
indexes (those of the Annalist, A.T.&T., and the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York).
The relation of Cox's scores to recognition of cyclical turning points
is not clear. The scores during the six months before and after a cyclical
peak or trough may or may not pertain to forecasts of the turning points
in question. Nevertheless, Chart 1-3 is presented to supplement Chart
1-2. It displays some tendency toward increasing correctness of fore-
casts as turns are approached and passed, but the tendency isless
marked for the averages than in Chart 1-2. For 1929, the scores fluctu-
ate from month to month in a highly erratic fashion.
4
1948—61. Accuracy of Dating
For each of the eight turning points between 1948 and 1961, we have
studied reports published by a number of contemporary observers. Like
Cox, we first excerpted short quotations from current forecasts. We
scored the excerpts in two different ways, for accuracy of dating and
for degree of recognition. The scores for dating range from 0 to 100.
The maximum score was given for designating a peak or trough within
one month of the NBER date. A forecast that missed by two months
received a score of 75; by three months, 50; by four months, 25. Thus,
positive scores were given for forecasts of a peak or trough anywhere
within a nine-month interval centered on the NBER reference date. A
16Ibid., p. 19.